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THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
UNIFORMITY IN DUTIES, IMPOSTS AND
EXCISES.
Does the Constitution require that the duties, imposts and ex-
cises laid and collected by authority of the Congress in the territo-
ries, whether organized or unorganized, shall be uniform with those
laid and collected within the States constituting the Union?
The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representa-
tives has recently appointed a committee of five to report the
authorities and the law upon this question. If the United States is
to continue to hold the islands recently wrested from Spain, and,
when opportunity offers, to acquire other lands where the political
and industrial conditions differ widely from those prevailing in the
States, this question of power is one of the greatest moment.
Yet the question is one of constitutional construction simply.
For constitutional amendment is so difficult as to be improbable;
and the doctrine that the Constitution is the measure of the power
of the national government is the foundation of our system of con-
stitutional law. But it is to be hoped that the executive and legis-
lative branches of the government, as well as the judicial, not for-
getting that it is a vital clause in a constitution of government of
which they are seeking the meaning, will give it a broad and com-
prehensive interpretation to the end that the national government
may continue equal to the tasks imposed upon it.
The general principle is now well settled by legislative and
executive action and judicial decision that-to quote the language
of Mr. Justice Gray in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. i, 48,--"the
"United States, having rightfully acquired the territories, and being
"the only government which can impose laws upon them, have the
"entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal
"and State, over all the territories, so long as they remain in a ter--
"ritorial condition." This principle is more elaborately stated by
Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court in the case of Mormon
Church. v. United States, 136 U. S. i, 42, as follows:
"The power of Congress over the territories of the United
States is general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the
right to acquire the territory itself, and from the power given by
the Constitution to make all needful rules and regulations respect-
ing the territory and other property belonging to the United
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States. It would be absurd to hold that the United States has
power to acquire territory, and no power to govern it when
acquired. The power to acquire territory, other than the territory
northwest of the Ohio river (which belonged to the United States
at the adoption of the Constitution), is derived from the treaty-mak-
ing power and the power to declare and carry on war. The inci-
dents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and belong
to all independent governments. The power to make acquisitions
of territory by conquest, by treaty and by cession, is an incident of
national sovereignty. The territory of Louisiana, when acquired
from France, and the territories west of the Rocky Mountains,
when acquired from Mexico, became the absolute property and do-
main of the United States, subject to such conditions as the govern-
ment, in its diplomatic negotiations, had seen fit to accept relating
to the rights of the people then inhabiting those territories. Hav-
ing rightfully acquired said territories, the United States govern-
ment was the only one which could impose laws upon them, and its
sovereignty over them was complete. No State of the Union had
any such right of sovereignty over them; no other country or gov-
ernment had any such right. These propositions are so elemen-
tary, and so necessarily follow from the condition of things arising
upon the acquisition of new territory,, that they need no argument
to support them. They are self-evident."
This full and plenary power or sovereignty of Congress includes
the power to create territorial governments with such delegated.
power of local self-government as Congress may deem it proper to
confer, and as well the power to legislate directly 6n all matters
pertaining to the general and local government of the territories.
National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129, 133; Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15; Utter v. Franklin, 172 U. S. 416.
What express and implied limitations there are upon the
sovereign power of the United States to govern the territories, it is
difficult to say. For example, it has been held, though somewhat
hesitatingly, that the right to jury trial is secured to the people of
the territories and of the District of Columbia. Callan v. Wilson,
127 U. S. 540; American Publishing Company v. Fisher, 166 U. S.
464; Springville v. Thomas, I66 U. S. 707.
But it has been held that those provisions of Article III, relating
to the constitution and jurisdiction of the Federal courts and the
tenure of office of the Federal judges, do not operate as limitations
upon the power of Congress to create, directly or indirectly, a terri-
torial judiciary. American Insurance Co. v. Canter, i Peters 511;
McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174.
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Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, in his paper on "The People of the
United States," YALE LAw JOURNAL, Volume VIII, p 159, has
made an exceedingly valuable contribution to the learning upon
this subject. His opinion is that many of the Constitutional limita-
tions were created solely for the benefit of the persons who are citi-
zens of the United States and of the States constituting the Union,
while other limitations are for the protection of all persons who are
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States regardless of their
citizenship. Article X of the Amendments provides: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." But no power of government is by the Constitution
reserved to the people of the territories; and neither the States nor
the people thereof can exercise any power of government in the ter-
ritories save through the agency of the Union. In view of the de-
cisions it is reasonably certain that those constitutional limitations
upon the powers of Congress which are designed to secure the civil
rights of persons, as such, are operative wherever the power itself
may be exercised, whether in the States or the territories.
In defining the taxing power of the United States, the framers
of the Constitution were chiefly concerned with the proper defini-
tion of the relations to subsist between the States and the United
States. The powers which Congress was to exercise in the States
were carefully enumerated and defined. But by the same instru-
ment Congress was given the power to exercise exclusive legisla-
tion over the seat of the national government; and according to
settled principles, its power over the territories is not less extensive.
The provisions of the Constitution relating to taxation and to
the regulation of commerce by Congress, must be construed to-
gether. "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective numbers. * * * the Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and ex-
cises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense, and
general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and ex-
cises shall be uniform throughout the United States; * * *
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
* States, and with the Indian tribes; * * * no capitation, nor
other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census
or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken. No tax or duty
shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference
shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the
ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to,
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or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in an-
other."
The operation of the clauses relating to direct taxation and to
the apportionment thereof, is expressly limited to the States. The
express power to lay and collect taxes of the direct kind and of the
indirect, is granted by the same clause; and this clause is contained
in a section which defines and enumerates specially the powers
which Congress may exercise within the States. It is impossible
that the definition and enumeration of powers in this section were
intended to derogate at all from the power expressly granted to
Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may by cession
of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat
of government of the United States," * * * and to "make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other
property belonging to the United States." This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the purpose for which Congress is to
exercise the power of taxation granted to it by the first clause of
Section 8 of Article I, is "to pay the debts, and provide for the com-
mon defense and general welfare of the United States." The power
to levy taxes for such purposes does not include the power to lay
and collect taxes to defray the expenses of local government in the
territories and in th e District of Columbia. Yet, from the founda-
tion of the government to the present time, the governments of the
territories and the District of Columbia in the exercise of powers
delegated by Congress-powers which Congress could as well have
exercised directly-have laid and collected direct taxes and excises
of various kinds in order to defray the expense of territorial and
district government. Numerous cases involving the validity of par-
ticular taxes levied by territorial and district governments have
gone to the Supreme Court of the United States, some of the more
recent cases being, Maricopa & P. R. Co. v. Ariaona, 156 U. S. 347;
McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264;
Wagoner v. Evans, 17o U. S. 588. But it has not occurred either to
the Bench or to the Bar to contest the validity of such taxes, be-
cause the direct taxes were not laid by the rule of apportionment,
or the indirect by the rule of uniformity prescribed by the Consti-
tution for the guidance of Congress in exercising its power of taxa-
tion within the States.
To construe the Constitution as requiring duties, imposts and
excises laid and collected in the territories to be uniform with those
laid and collected in the States, is to deny to Congress and to the
territorial legislatures the power to impose license taxes and any
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other kind of excises within the territories without imposing the
like license tax upon the people of the United States, and, logically,
the power to impose direct taxes upon persons and property in the
territories, unless it be done as a part of a general levy by apportion-
ment among the States. The validity of Sections 1924 and 1925 of
the United States Revised Statutes, which require that all property
in the territories shall be assessed and taxed in proportion to its
value, has never been questioned. The settled and unquestioned
usage and practice of government, except in the case of duties upon
imports, is therefore opposed to the view that the first clause of
Section 8 has any application to the territories.
The fact that the industrial conditions prevailing in the terri-
tories are similar to those in the States, and the resulting facts that
Congress has imposed no tax upon commerce among the States,
and has imposed the same duties upon foreign goods imported into
the territories as upon the like goods imported into the States, have
given rise to an ill-defined belief that there is something in the Con-
stitution which restrains Congress from imposing taxes upon com-
merce between the several States and between the States and terri-
"tories, and requires the duties upon goods imported into territories
to be uniform with those imposed upon the like goods imported into
the States. It will be conceded by every one that Congress may
impose license taxes or excises within the territories without
imposing at the same time similar license taxes and excises
within the States, while it is stoutly contended that duties
upon imports must be uniform throughout the States and
territories. But it is to be observed that, if the Constitution requires
duties upon imports to be uniform, it must also require imposts and
excises to be uniform. The unfounded notion that no taxes can be
imposed by Congress upon commerce between the States and terri-
tories is largely responsible for this. But there is nothing in the
Constitution which restrains Congress from laying duties upon
goods imported into the States from the Philippine Islands or other
territories. This position is supported by several decisions which
uphold the right of Congress to prohibit the importation, manufac-
ture and sale of intoxicating liquors in Alaska. United States v.
Nelson, 29 Fed. Rep. 202; Nelson v. United States, 30 Fed. Rep. I12;
Endleinan v. United States, 86 Fed. Rep. 456. For the power to pro-
hibit the importation of any commodity into a territory includes
the power to require the payment of a duty as a condition to the
granting of permission to import and sell it.
There are two cases which are often cited in support of the op-
posing view. The first is Cross v. Harrison, i6 How. 164, wherein
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it was decided that- the plaintiff below, having paid duties upon
imports to the officers of the provisional government in California
prior to its admission into the Union as a State, the payment haing
been made without real coercion, and Congress having adopted and
ratified all the acts of the provisional government, could not recover
the money which he had paid. This case presented no question con-
cerning the Constitutional power of Congress, but one of statutory
construction only. The second case is Loughborouglh v. Blake, 5
Wheat. 317, wherein it is decided that Congress possesses, under
the Constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within
the District of Columbia in proportion to the census directed to be
taken by the Constitution. But it is conceded by the court that
Congress may lawfully impose direct taxes in the District for Dis-
trict purposes without regard to the rule of apportionment, and
that Congress is under no constitutional necessity to impose direct
taxes by the rule of apportionment upon the District of Columbia,
or upon the territories, even though such a direct tax is laid upon
the States. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion
of the court, expresses the opinion that the term "United
States," as used in the first clause of Section 8 of Article I
of the Constitution, includes both States and territories, and
that "it is not less necessary on the principles of our Constitu-
tion that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties and excises
should be observed in the one than in the other." This dictum of
the great chief justice is entitled to great consideration; but if we
adopt the logic of his opinion, we would arrive at this conclusion,
viz.: that Congress has the constitutional power to levy duties, im-
posts and excises in the territories for local purposes without regard
to the so-called rule of uniformity, and that it is not constitutionally
necessary for Congress to levy any duties, imposts and excises in
the territories for national purposes, even though duties, imposts
and excises be levied within the States. But this dictum is very
unsatisfactory and entirely inconsistent with the general principles
of constitutional law, which have been so carefully considered and
elaborated in the decisions which I have already cited. I am con-
vinced that the term "United States," as employed in the first clause
of Section 8 of Article I, must be understood as referring only to
the constituent members of the Union. This is clearly the sense in
which the term "United States" is used in the preamble, in Sections
I, 2, 3, 6 and io of Article I, and in Section i of Article III.
WILLIAM BRAkDFORD BOSLEY.
